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Abstract
HTTP Get Flood attack is known as the most common DDOS attack on the application layer with a frequency of 21 percent in all attacks.
Since a huge amount of requests is sent to the Web Server for receiving pages and also the volume of responses issued by the server is much
more than the volume received by zombies in this kind of attack, hence it could be done by small botnets; in the other hand, because every
zombie attempts to issue the request by the use of its real address, carries out all stages of the three-stage handshakes, and the context of the
requests is fully consistent with the HTTP protocol, the techniques of fake address detection and anomaly detection in text could not be
employed. The mechanisms that are used to deal with this attack not only have much processing overload but also may cause two kinds of “False
Negative” (To realize wrongly the fake traffic as the real traffic) and “False Positive” (To realize wrongly the real traffic as the fake traffic) errors.
Therefore a method is proposed that is able to adapt itself to the traffic by the use of low processing overload and it has less error than the similar
systems and using this way.
© 2017 Faculty of Computers and Information Technology, Future University in Egypt. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. This is an open
access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Keywords: DDOS; HTTP-GET flood attacks; IOSEC

1. Introduction
1.1. Methods of HTTP-GET flood detection
Various methods have been suggested for detection and
intensity reduction of HTTP Get Flood attack by different
people, some of which are listed in the following.







Using the puzzle CAPTCHA [1];
Detecting the same sequence of requests [2];
Detecting the speed of browsing pages [2];
Predicting the attack by the use of attack rate [3];
Detecting the relationship between users' requests [4];
The number of requests in the specific period of time
[5,17];
 Scoring to the connection [6];

E-mail address: hmirvaziri@uk.ac.ir.
Peer review under responsibility of the Faculty of Computers and
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 Detecting the pattern of requests [7];
 Determining the extent of the existent risk in accessing to
the pages [8];
 Using the infrastructure of the detection complex of
DDOS (IDDI)1 attacks [17];
 Detecting the abnormality in the requests [9];
 Using several methods sequentially [10];
 Load balancing [11,12,15];
 Using priority queues with different bandwidth [12];
 IP HoppingeMoving target defense mechanism [13];
 Using hidden cache of the browser [14];
 Blocking by use of Access Control Lists (ACL) [14];
 Using hardware methods [16].
Among the above methods, “The number of requests in the
specific period of time” method has a small processing load
and is one of the most practical ways that could reduce the
intensity of this kind of attack. In this method, determining the
1
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number of requests in a pre-determined period of time is taken
into account, and if it exceeds from a specific threshold, then it
is identified as traffic attack and consequently blocked. In this
method, the allowed number of each user's requests is significantly important as well as the determining of time interval,
so that the extent of accuracy and correct performance of this
method depends completely on these two parameters. For
example, even so the number of 100 requests in 10 s is
mathematically equal to 10 requests in 1 s, but each of them
shows a different performance when it is required to have legal
selection in order to distinguish the real traffic from the fake
one. The system IOSEC uses this method, and in this paper, it
is used as a criterion to measure the extent of accuracy in the
proposed method.
In IOSEC system which is installed as a plug-in on the
context management system Word Press, a request from every
user is identified in every 500 ms which is allowable by
default, and if the number of requests sending by a user exceeds from the mentioned number in this period of time, a
page like Fig. 5 is displayed to the user. This page is changed
by default after 10 s and the user requested page is displayed.
If the user resends a request before finishing the 10 s then the
mentioned page is shown again for him and the inside timer
will start recounting from 10. In this system, the mentioned
page can be sent unlimitedly to the user, unless the user resolves the puzzle at the bottom of the page. The user by
resolving the puzzle that is located at the bottom of the page
introduces him as the legal user, and he will not see such a
page anymore (after he is added to the white list). It is trivial
that if a hacker can success to solve the puzzle for each agent
and put address of that agent in the white list, this system
would not resist against the issued attack from that agent
anymore.
2. Materials and methods
2.1. Discussion about the proposed method
Most of introduced methods dealing with HTTP Get Flood
attack are depend on the analysis of the site's traffic at the
non-attack times; and due to using different parameters, they
have processing and storing overload and do not have much
functionality in the practical environments. Among the
mentioned methods, “the determination of the number of
allowed requests in a specific time” has a small overload and
is usable in the practical environment, but the determination
of the mentioned parameters in this method requires gathering the traffic history for each site; therefore, this method is
not easily movable, and also since traffic of a site in different
times is influenced by the emotions of users during their visit,
so this method does not have high accuracy. Simplicity and
applicability of this method caused that a technique is created
which has high accuracy in addition to have the ability of
implementing by hardware and software. It has also high
portability without any knowledge of content and traffic
history of the site. In this paper, HGFMS method is introduced with portability and traffic adaptability as well as
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hardware applicability. The location of this system is shown
in Fig. 1.
HGFMS makes the number of requests automatic and time
interval in different states is consistent with traffic by introducing a new criterion as server status and by using of random
time delay mechanisms as well as by using of trap link.
Therefore it can be used without having a traffic history to
display more accurate performance.
In HGFMS, we assume the maximum response time of the
server to the requested pages (not components within the page)
is in second unit in the main bottleneck and also the main user
uses at most 40 percent of the server power in the abovementioned criterion so the current state of the server can be
divided into normal and abnormal. In other words, if server is
working with more than 40% of its power, the abnormal state
is considered; the traffic of users is suspected and a page is
shown to the user as shown in Fig. 2. In the mentioned page,
there is a button to continue which is activated after the displayed time in the button and by pressing it the user is directed
to the requested page.
To deal with intelligent agents, the following cases are
considered in the waiting page shown to the user:
1. The length of delay time is selected randomly in the interval of 30e60 s, and the user is allowed to press the
mentioned button after finishing the mentioned time,
therefore if the time distance between the requests of
participant agents in the attack is more than the specified
amount or less than it, the traffic attack would be detected.
2. The link of requested page is not placed directly in
backside of the button; thus, if a request is sent to the link
in the backside of the button before finishing the appropriate time in the page, this indicates that request is issued
by an intelligent agent.
3. Considering that in the worst situations, intelligent agents
act exactly like downloader programs of the site and
attempt to issue a request to the all built-in links within the
page, the trap link has been used at the beginning of all
pages in the site. If there is a request to the trap link, it
immediately put the related IP into the black list and
blocks other requests from that IP.
It should be noted that intelligent agents usually use multi
threads at the same time to issue a request to the links within
the page and therefore the number of available trap links
within the page and even the location of them is effective in
the number of responses the agent receives before being
blocked; for example site downloader software and intelligent
agents with similar behavior can be blocked by placing the
trap link at the beginning and at the end of the first page of
those kinds of sites that have only a few limited links to select
language.
In the flowchart of proposed system which is illustrated in
Fig. 3 the following structures have been used:
1. List of requests to access to the page: all requests to
receive the pages together with the receiving time and the

Mirvaziri: A new method to reduce the effects of HTTP-Get Flood attack
H. Mirvaziri / Future Computing and Informatics Journal 2 (2017) 87e93

89

Fig. 1. The location of the proposed system.

Fig. 2. Waiting page to confirm the identity of the requester.

IP address of the requester are stored in a table and by the
use of this table the number of requests of every IP at is
calculated a time unit.
2. The table of suspicious IPs: those IPs that are suspicious
and send them waiting page, are kept in this list. Also the
address of requested page as well as a list of suspecting
times is kept in this list. In the proposed system, each IP
could be suspected three times at most; in the other words,
the time-delay page would be shown at most three times
for each IP address and if the related button is not pressed
during these times, that IP address would be moved to the
black list, and its future communication would be blocked.
3. The history list: the suspicious IP addresses and times that
managed to pass the time-delay stage successfully when
the server was in normal state, are placed in this list. This
list will be used to enhance the threshold amount of the
number of requests in the specified time interval.
4. The black list: the IP addresses that are known as unallowable and are not allowed to use the server are kept in
this list.

Published by Arab Journals Platform, 2017

2.2. Theory of the proposed system
In the beginning, the request sender's address and the addresses within black list are investigated, and only the addresses that are not within the black list is allowed to continue;
then the page request is investigated and if a request for the
forbidden page is received, its sender address is placed in the
black list and their specifications are removed from the history
and specious list as shown in Fig. 3.
In the next stage, the speciousness of the sender's address is
investigated, and if it is not in the specious list, there are two
cases:
1. The number of user requests is more than the threshold at
the time unit. In this case, the user is suspected and a timewait page will be sent to him. The user who receives the
time-wait page is allowed to be reentered to the site only
by a click on the button inside it. This button, is deactivated for 30e60 s in the beginning and then it is activated
so the user should press the button at most 10 s after
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The page request happens

Is sender’s
IP in the
black list?

YES
Send the answer

NO

1- Add to the black list
2- Remove from the specious list
3- Remove from the history list

1- Update the specious list
2- Show the wait page

YES

NO

1- Add to the black list
2- Remove from the specious
list
3- Remove from the history list

Has the
address
under button
requested?

YES

NO

Has he
requested
more than
three times?

YES

1- Add to the black list
2- Remove from the specious
list
3- Remove from the history list

1- Reduce the threshold amount of the number of
the requests at the time unit
2-Add to the specious list
3- Send the wait page

NO

YES

NO

Has the request
reach before
finishing wait
time?

Is the
request for
trap link?

YES

Is IP
specious?

NO
Is the number
of requests
more than the
allowed?

NO

NO

YES

YES
1- Send the requested page
2- Remove from the specious
list

1- Update the specious list
2- Show the wait page

1- Add to the specious list
2- Send the wait page

Reject request

NO

YES

Has the request
reached after the
allowed time?

Is the server
in the normal
state?

NO

Is the server in
the normal
state?

YES

1- Send the requested page
2- Remove from the specious
list
3- Add to the history

In the recent 5 min, is
there the user address
more than one time in
the history list?

YES

Increasing the threshold
amount of the allowed number
of the user request at the time
unit

Fig. 3. Flowchart of the proposed system.

activating. If, for any reason, the user could not do this, or
he recalls the page or presses the back button of his
browser, this page is shown to him again. In total, if the
page is seen three times by the user, but the user does not
press the button inside it, then that IP address will be
blocked at the next visit. On the other way, if the suspicious user presses the related button at the specified time
and the server was in the normal state, in addition to
sending the considered page to the user and removing his
address from the list of suspicious users, the address and
the time of accepting his request is recorded in the history
list. Then, it is investigated at the defined time interval if
the above user has repeated the above stages more than
once or not. If the user address has been repeated more
than once at the specified length of time, it means that,
probably, the defined threshold for the number of requests
at the time unit is so small that result in this event, so one
unit is added to it. Thus the system detects and applies the
optimal value by increasing and reducing the mentioned
threshold at different times. It should be noted that if the
user presses the button at the specified time but the server
is not in the normal state, then a request page will be
shown to him and his address will not be added to the
history list; therefore the history list includes only the
accepting times and the addresses of the specious users

https://digitalcommons.aaru.edu.jo/fcij/vol2/iss2/3

who have stepped forward the waiting stage correctly
when the server was in the normal state.
2. The number of user requests is less than the threshold at
the time unit. In this case, the server status should also be
investigated and the appropriate behavior should be done
with respect to its status. If the server is in the normal
state, then the requested page is sent to the user but if the
server is not in the normal case, there are another two
cases:
a. The defined threshold for the number of allowed
requests is more than the needed value at the time
unit.
b. The server has been attacked by a large botnet.
To prevent the first possibility, defined threshold is subtracted by one if it is higher than one and in the second case,
send a time-wait page to all the users (all of them are suspected) in order to understand the human nature of the requests issuers (see Table 1).
2.3. Implementation of HGFMS (proposed method):
practical approach
To implement HGFMS, the content management system
Word Press was used to create a site with seven designed pages
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Table 1
Specifications of the server system.
Operating System
CPU
RAM
Hard Disk Capacity
Speed of the Network Card
Launched Version of the Server

Windows 7 Ultimate x64
AMD Athlon 64 X2 5000
4 GB
320 GB
100 Mb/s
XAMPP v5.6.11
PHP 5.5.27
MySQL 5.6.25
Apache 2.4.12

Table 2
Specifications of the pages of the test site.
The address of each page

The number of the
requests for receiving
the page and its internal
components

http://192.168.142.100/
http://192.168.142.100/?page_id¼74
http://192.168.142.100/?page_id¼96
http://192.168.142.100/?page_id¼44
http://192.168.142.100/?page_id¼23
http://192.168.142.100/?page_id¼112
http://192.168.142.100/?page_id¼12

15
25
26
18
13
12
14

according to Table 2 and it is installed on a system with the
specifications shown in this Table. Both systems; HGFMS and
IOSEC; are installed as a plug-in on the mentioned content
management system and reaction of them is recorded by
activating each of the mentioned plug-ins separately in every
stage and the attack is performed.
By the use of mentioned content management system and
the addition of the following line in the header file, the trap
link was added to the beginning of all pages. As it is clear
from the html code, to hide the link from the users' eyes, no
text has been written for it. It should be noted that the trap link
is hidden from the users' eyes, but it is visible for the site
download software, such as Teleport, Pro and intelligent
agents that operate within the same way, and they should send
a request to receive them like other links inside the page,
<ahref¼“http://192.168.142.100/?page_id¼BlockMe”></a>
Employed topology to test HGFMS system is shown in
Fig. 4. In this implementation, the operating system is
Linux.BoNeSi and LOIC softwares are used to simulate the
traffic of the HTTP Get Flood attack and F52 attacks respectively. In order to convergence of this system and to obtain an
appropriate value for threshold of allowed number of the
request, a client attempted to send his requests, and on
average, after 5 h and passing 4 times of waiting page, the
threshold value was changed from its initial value to 5. The

Fig. 4. Topology used in the implemented environment.
Table 3
Operation of the proposed system and measured time by a typical user.
Operation

Time

Initial value of allowed number of the
requests in 30 s
Duration of adapting to the traffic
Average number of requests
The number of times seeing waiting page
Final value of the allowed number of
requests in 30 s

1
5h
1133
4
5

Table 4
Values in the implementation of the proposed method.
Title

Value

The maximum number of the
requests in second
Threshold of the normal server
performance
Duration to calculate the allowed
number of the user requests
Initial value for the allowed number
of the user requests
Time interval between the requests of
legal users
Duration of the wait shown on the
waiting page
Allowed duration to press the
available button on the waiting
page
Time of holding and applying the
history

15
6
30 s
1
Randomly between 2 and 30 s
Randomly between 30 and 60 s
10 s

5s

information related to this period is presented in Table 3. Also,
the values that are used to implement the proposed system are
given in Table 4.
3. Comparison between proposed and similar systems

2
In attacks F5, the browser, under the effect of the available script inside the
site or through holding the button F5 by user (the Refresh operations in many
browsers is done by the button F5), attempts to send sequential and same
requests to the regarded site.
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Fig. 5. Time delay page shown by the IOSEC plug-in.

requests at the time unit is used to detect the traffic of attack.
This system is available in the form of a plug-in on the content
management system. In this plug-in, the allowed number of
user's requests is calculated in the time unit, and if it exceeds
from the pre-determined specific value, a page is shown to the
user similar to the Fig. 5. The settings and the specifications of
both systems are given in Table 5.

4. Results
In this article two methods, IOSEC and HGFMS (proposed
method) is implemented and after carrying out different attacks on both mentioned methods the results in Table 6 are
achieved. According to these results, HGFMS behave much
more effective than IOSEC dealing with a variety attack

Table 5
Comparison of the proposed method with the method introduced in Ref. [5].

The time interval of the calculation
of the requests
The number of requests in the time
interval
The benchmark to calculate the
server capacity
The way to seal with the suspicious
traffic
The number of successive
suspiciousness to an address
Permanent removing of the
suspicious traffic
Adaptability to traffic
The calculation benchmark
Criterion of attack detection

Ability to deal with the intelligent
agents
The ability to deal with the agents
that have the capability of
adjusting the request rate
The possibility to introduce the agent
as legal user

IOSEC

HGFMS

500 ms

30 s

2

Variable

Does not have

Request for page in seconds

Sends the time waiting page
together with the puzzle
CAPTCHA
Infinite

Sends the wait page

At most three times

Dose not have

By the use of the black list

Does not have
Number of all requests at time unit
Exceeds from the defined threshold
for the maximum of user requests
at time unit
Does not have

Has
Number of the requests to receive the
page at time unit
Exceeds from the defined threshold
for the maximum of user requests for
the user page at time unit
Has (Using the trap link)

Does not have

Has

using the resolution of the puzzle
CAPTCHA and recording the agent's
address in the white list

Does not have

https://digitalcommons.aaru.edu.jo/fcij/vol2/iss2/3
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Table 6
Comparing the performance of the system dealing with the attack of the
intelligent agents.

The number of the
received files with 10
threads at the same
time
The number of the
received files with 1
thread in an interval of
1s
The number of the
received files with 1
thread in an interval of
30 s
The extent of
responsiveness to users
at time of the attack F5
by the use of one agent
False positive

IOSEC

HGFMS

44
Success rate: 29%

27
Success rate: 56%

62
Success rate: 0%

29
Success rate: 53%

62
Success rate: 0%

29
Success rate: 53%

0%

100%

12%

1%

factors and provides conditions for the server to serve its users
even at the time of attack.
5. Conclusion and suggestion
By taking advantage of new features of HGFMS, it is
concluded that it has a better performance comparing with
similar system. The feature of trap link is caused that the
proposed system can block the traffic of the downloader
software of the site and the intelligent agents that have similar
behavior. Also, it has been able to adapt the allowed number of
requests to the traffic and situation of the server by use of a
new parameter called the server status without the need to
have the site's traffic history. Therefore it has the ability to deal
with different rates of attacks and will have fewer errors than
the similar methods. Moreover, using waiting page with variable time instead of CAPTCHA puzzle makes it user-friendly
and natural secure system. It has high portability because of
independency on site content. Hardware implementation is
suggested in order to separate the processing load related to
this system. Also, it is recommended that Tarpitting is used
instead of removing requests of the users who are put in the
black list to reduce processing load of the server and impose
the processing load on the agent which leads them to be
removed.
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